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ABSTRACT  
There are many applications available for personal computers and mobile devices that facilitate users in 
meeting potential partners. There is, however, a risk associated with the level of anonymity on using instant 
message applications, because there exists the potential for predators to attract and lure vulnerable users. 
Today Instant Messaging within a Virtual Universe (IMVU) combines custom avatars, chat or instant 
message (IM), community, content creation, commerce, and anonymity. IMVU is also being exploited by 
criminals to commit a wide variety of offenses. However, there are very few researches on digital forensic 
acquisition of IMVU applications. In this paper, we discuss first of all on challenges of IMVU forensics. We 
present a forensic acquisition of an IMVU 3D application as a case study. We also describe and analyse our 
experiments with this application.  
Keywords: Instant Messaging, forensic acquisition, Virtual Universe 3D, forensic process, forensic case 
study  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Instant messaging (IM) is one of the most popular 
digital communication technologies and is widely 
used today. In fact, IM belongs to the category of 
Internet based communication services. 
Traditionally the IM was designed to transfer text 
messages only, but now it has been enhanced with 
additional features such as voice/video message, file 
transfer, etc. Moreover, IM can be accessible 
through cell phones or other mobile devices, as well 
as on a computer. It is estimated that there are several 
millions of IM users who use IM for various 
purposes. There are numerous IM applications 
available for download today [1]. 
Besides, IM applications (apps) also allow users to 
create a detailed personal profile including name, 
email address, age, home address, phone number, 
school and hobbies. If users do not verify carefully 
during the sign-up process, they could reveal more 
information than they should. Easy accessible 
profiles can allow anyone to contact IM users. 
Indeed, some IM apps offer users the option of 
joining in chat with strangers. As a consequence, 
using of IM apps can encourage gossiping and 
bullying. Children could receive pornographic 
"spam" through IM apps or become victim of Sexual 
grooming of children [2]. In the recent years, police 
investigators have noticed that IM apps have been 
directly or indirectly involved in criminal activities. 
Due to their popularity, IM apps have the potential 
of being a rich source of evidential value in all kinds 
of criminal investigations. Indeed, Europol has 
identified the threat of misused IM communications 
by criminals to facilitate their illegal activities due to 
the fact that it is harder to monitor or to regulate 
these services [3].  
On the other hand, a virtual universe is a computer-
based simulated environment. In a 3D virtual 
universe, the users can take the form of 3D avatars 
(virtual character) visible to others. Today, Instant 
Messaging within a Virtual Universe (IMVU) 
combines custom avatars, chat/IM, community, 
content creation, commerce, and anonymity [4]. 
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IMVU contains its own economy with a currency 
system based on IMVU "credits" and "promotional 
credits". Credits can be purchased online using 
actual currency either directly from IMVU or from 
third party re-sellers. IMVU members use the credits 
to purchase virtual items like fashion pieces (hair, 
clothes, skins, and accessories), pets, and 3D scenes 
such as homes, clubs and open landscapes. Except 
‘VIP users’, everyone has “Guest_” in front of 
his/her avatar name. To become a VIP you need to 
buy a subscription. There are benefits for VIPs such 
as extra credits, block unwanted avatar actions, 
unlock VIP-only avatar actions and whisper 
privately in chats. It is also possible to buy an 
‘Access Pass’. The Access Pass is available for those 
18 years old and older. It grants access to more 
risqué clothing and slightly more intimate furniture 
and poses. It also allows chatting to adults only. 
IMVU was also mentioned as a common Virtual 
World addressing ‘Crime and Policing in Virtual 
Worlds’ (2010) by Marc Goodman [5]. He 
concludes that criminals can exploit this new 
technology to commit a wide variety of offenses. 
Almost any types of crime in the real world can also 
be found in virtual spaces from child abuse to 
terrorist attacks. Besides, the presence of child 
pornography in chat has also been denounced in 3D 
social networks like IMVU. Indeed, the emerging of 
3D social networks is rapidly tainted with child 
pornography as stated in [6]. 
In fact, there are many tools available for collecting 
artefacts, some of them specific for chat/IM such as 
Paraben chat examiner [7] or Belkasoft Evidence 
Centre 2015 [8]. However, at the time of writing this 
paper, none of them supports the investigation of 
IMVU apps. Despite that IMVU exists a while, has 
millions of users worldwide and it is associated with 
child abuse (material), to the best of our knowledge 
there is any technique or software tool for forensic 
acquisition and analysis of IMVU artefacts. 
Therefore, the objective of this paper is to 
investigate whether it is possible to forensically 
acquire and analyse artefacts on a computer after the 
installation and use of the IMVU application. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: 
Section 2 shows the background of this research 
including related work in this domain. We present 
IMVU apps and forensic process in Section 3. We 
describe our case study in Section 4 and discuss on 
experiment results in Section 5 and 6. We conclude 
and discuss on future work in Section 7. 
2. RELATED WORK 
In fact, we have tried to find in literature about this 
specific subject, but to the best of our knowledge, 
there is no published research regarding forensic 
artefacts of IMVU. Hence, we present some 
literature survey on the forensic acquisition and 
analysis of IM applications in general. A more 
traditional investigation method of IM has been 
described in [9]. This handbook has covered basic 
instructions on the procedures to gather digital 
information from IM such as: the screen or user 
name (victim and suspect), the IM service being 
used and version of the software, the content 
(witness account of contact or activity), the date and 
time the message was received/viewed, the dates and 
times of previous contacts, any logging or printouts 
of communications saved by the victim, applicable 
passwords. Besides, when investigating crimes 
involving IM services, investigators normally 
extract the following information from a chat room: 
(i) Name of the chat room; (ii) Web address of the 
chat room; (iii) Screen or user name (victim and 
suspect); (iv) Chat software being used, and version 
of the software; (v) Content (witness account of 
contact or activity); (vi) Date and time the 
communication took place; (vii) Dates and times of 
previous sessions where similar activity took place; 
(viii) Logging or printouts of communications saved 
by the victim and (ix) Applicable passwords. 
Kiley et al [10] conducted some research on IM 
forensic artefacts and they also pointed out that IM 
is being exploited by criminals due to its popularity 
and privacy features.  As mentioned in their paper, 
one of the challenges for forensic examiners is the 
web-based instant messaging when they don’t write 
to registry keys or files. Apart from the typical 
conversation log showing on screen, and possible 
chat log saved on the logical drive, evidence of 
conversation could also be found in page files and 
unallocated hard disk due to the volatile nature of the 
data. Investigators should, therefore, look for 
remnants of whole or partial conversations that may 
be dumped to page files and unallocated space on the 
hard disk. One of the conclusions from this work is 
that forensic evidence is recoverable after these 
programs have been used, but investigators must 
know certain elements of the conversations in order 
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to perform string searches. Even so, time consuming 
sector-by-sector searches is huge to uncover all the 
potential evidence. 
Lun [11] describes the popularity of IMs and the 
challenges by extracting information from these IMs 
by Law Enforcement. He has reviewed techniques 
and forensic tools designed by different developers 
to extract relevant information. He also posed the 
question; ‘are the current forensic techniques and 
tools adequate?’ and presents different techniques 
that might apply on extracting information under 
different scenarios. He also listed useful sources of 
information such as the Windows registry, physical 
memory (RAM), hibernation file and page file. An 
off the shelf forensic tool Belkasoft Evidence Center 
was used to extract evidence from the MSN live 
messenger environment. His finding indicated that 
the forensic tool was able to aid the forensic 
examiner to extract digital evidence from instant 
messenger, but it was not comprehensive enough at 
that forensic examiners could not rely on one tool 
during an investigation. 
Dickson [12] describes the examination of AOL 
Instant Messenger (AIM) 5.5. This research focuses 
on the contact information (identification) and the 
ability to trace back from a known suspect’s 
computer system to identify contact with his alleged 
victims. This is specifically interesting when an 
allegation of grooming is made. According to the 
author, one of the first things an examiner should do 
is to determine the suspect’s computer system that 
was used to contact the informant’s account in the 
first place. The author also states that this is a strong 
evidential link between victim and suspect and it 
also clearly demonstrates that the suspect was 
responsible for that contact rather than a third party 
who may have taken control of the suspect’s chat 
account. The author moreover illustrates some 
methods of proving a link where the suspect and 
victim have been in contact on the Yahoo Messenger 
chat service. 
Husain et al. [13] describe the Forensic Analysis of 
Instant Messaging on Smart Phones. They studied 
and reported the forensic analysis of three different 
IMs: AIM, Yahoo! Messenger and Google Talk on 
Apple iPhone. Their results have shown that various 
useful artefacts, related to IMs, can be recovered, 
including username, password, buddy list, last log-
in time, and conversation timestamp as well as 
conversation details. 
In [14], authors observed that the relevant research 
on the topic of evidence collection from IM services 
was limited. Authors presented the forensic 
acquisition and analysis of WhatsApp, Viber, Skype 
and Tango IMs and VoIPs for both iOS and Android 
platforms and authors tried to answer on how 
evidence can be collected when IM communications 
are used. Authors also referred to the fact that 
Europol has identified the threat of misused IM 
communications by criminals to facilitate their 
illegal activities due to the fact that it is harder to 
monitor or regulate these services. The objective was 
to identify the artefacts stored by each IM 
application in the file system of every seized device. 
This work provides useful information that assists us 
in developing our case study in this paper. More 
precisely the authors have provided a very useful 
taxonomy of target artefacts.    
3. IMVU AND FORENSIC PROCESS 
In this section, we describe our forensic process for 
investigating IMVU apps. The objective of this 
paper is to forensically examine significant artefacts 
present on a computer after the installation and use 
of the IMVU apps. Therefore, the approach chosen 
is empirical or experimental research and differential 
forensic analysis. While there is no available 
technique or software tool to evaluate and there is 
very little known about IMVU artefacts, our 
approach includes the collection of data during 
experiments and try to discover significant forensic 
artefacts by observing and analysing the data. In fact, 
with an IMVU app, apart from the typical 
conversation log showing on screen, and possible 
(log) files saved on the logical drive, evidence of 
conversation could also be found in page files and 
unallocated hard disk space, the windows registry or 
volatile data in the internal memory (RAM). There 
are two main steps in our forensic process: data 
collection and data analysis. 
IMVU data collection: in this phase data is collected 
during the running time of an IMVU app. The 
contents of the IMVU application and data directory, 
unallocated disk space, the Windows registry, 
volatile data from the internal memory and network 
traffic are acquired. We attempt moreover to infer 
the behaviour of the IMVU application through the 
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reverse engineering process. The objective is to trace 
user activities, like the history of performed 
activities such as instant messages sent or received 
(chat logs), date and time stamp of the 
communication, sender, receiver and password. All 
experiments were carried out several times to ensure 
that results are repeatable. 
IMVU data analysis: This phase gives meaning to 
the data that have been collected so that the research 
question can be answered. Differential forensic 
analysis [15] is carried out by comparing the 
collected data (snapshot) before and after the 
experiments with IMVU to observe the differences 
between them such as report the files that have been 
added, deleted, renamed, and altered, the difference 
between Windows registry hive files. The objective 
of the analysis is to understand the changes and to 
determine if it contains any relevant information or 
not. A taxonomy of target artefacts is defined in 
order to guide and structure subsequent forensic 
analysis. The taxonomy used in our analysis is 
described in [14]. 
4. IMVU FORENSICS: A CASE STUDY 
In our case study, we use computers with 4GB of 
RAM, 30GB hard drive space formatted with the 
NTFS file system and network access (using a static 
IP address). The testing was conducted using 
Windows 7 Enterprise, SP1. Besides, the monitoring 
tool SysTracer was installed onto the system to 
record file activity and changes made to the 
Windows registry. Another computer was setup as a 
man-in-the-middle proxy using MITMproxy, 
running on the Ubuntu 14.04.1 LTS, this computer 
is used to monitor and intercept network traffic as 
shown in Figure 1. Next, an IMVU client program, 
version 514.0, was installed. In order to use IMVU, 
firstly a user has to create an account. For this case 
study, we create three IMVU accounts 
(InspectorAlgar, LadyElizabethSmall and 
missycanaryyellow). A valid Avatar name should 
contain letters and numbers and must be between 3 
and 20 characters. We conduct different 
conversations to create test data. The conversations 
were in public rooms but also limited by two 
participants. We created moreover an AutoIt [16] 
script that simulated an IMVU user. On beforehand 
a text file was created containing the conversation 
text of one of the discussion partners. A chat 
message was send to the IMVU application within a 
fixed (pre-adjustable) interval. By starting two 
scripts on different machines in appropriate time, we 
can simulate a chat conversation. The chat messages 
contained, the chat text and a Unix timestamp. An 
example from the chat messages is shown in Figure 
2. In the next two sections we present and analysis 
the forensic results of this case study related to the 
file system (Section 5) and the internal memory 
(Section 6). 
5. IMVU: FILE SYSTEM FORENSICS 
In this section, we describe our forensic acquisition 
results of IMVU file systems including application 
file, log files, profile data and location data.  
5.1 Application Files 
IMVU application files are stored in: 
C:\Users\<Username>\AppData\Roaming\IMVUC
lient\ folder. This path is fixed during the 
installation. During the installation a shortcut to 
IMVUQualityAgent.exe is added into the Windows 
Start-up folder as well on the user's desktop. We also 
found that IMVU uses Mozilla's Gecko rendering 
engine and the XML User Interface Language for 
building its user interface [17]. 
Besides, a configuration file imvu.cfg is added into 
the user Flash Player Trust folder: 
C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Mac
romedia\FlashPlayer\#Security\FlashPlayerTrust\. 
Configuration files inside this FlashPlayerTrust 
folder normally contain a list of directory paths. We 
also observe that application shortcuts are added to 
IMVU folder: C:\Users\%USERNAME% 
\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\StartMenu\
Programs\IMVU\. We found moreover the IMVU 
application is written in Python and the compiled 
script files are stored in library.zip: C:\Users\ 
Robert\AppData\Roaming\IMVUClient\library.zip. 
We also decompile these files using Easy Python 
Decompiler and to explore the IMVU application 
through reverse engineering. 
5.2 Log Files 
IMVU log files are stored in C:\Users\ 
<Username>\AppData\Roaming\IMVU\ folder 
including cpp.log, IMVUQualityAgent.log, 
IMVULog.log, etc. The cpp.log contains information 
related to user interface and this file is created every 
time the application starts. The 
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IMVUQualityAgent.log file is also created every 
time the application starts. It contains ‘application 
validation’ information and local time stamp. 
Regarding to IMVULog.log file, from the digital 
forensics examination point of view, this file 
contains the most valuable information. In fact, this 
log file is generated by a roud-robin process based 
on session and file size. A new log file is created 
every time the application starts. When the size of 
the log file is greater than 2MB (2097152 bytes), this 
process successively create new files with the  
 
Figure 1 MITM proxy setup 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Chat script usage example 
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same pathname as the first file, but with different 
extensions started with ".1", ".2" and so on. If it is 
greater than “.6”, the extension restarts from “.1”, 
older files will be deleted. We found moreover the 
definition of this round-robin process in the Python 
script log.pyo from library.zip file mentioned in 
Section 2.1. Each record in IMVULog.log file 
contains the following attributes (Figure 3): 
1. The number of seconds since start of 
application: Floating point decimal value. The 
length is 6 characters minimum including the 
dot and 3 decimals (milliseconds rounded). If 
the length is less than 6, a leading 0 is added. 
2. The thread id: String value, length fixed with 
5 characters, padded by spaces if necessary. 
3. File name of the source file where the logging 
call was issued: String value, length fixed with 
30 characters, padded by spaces if necessary 
4. Source line number where the logging call 
was issued: Signed integer decimal value, 
length fixed with 4 digits, padded by spaces if 
necessary. 
5. The logging level for the message: String 
value, length fixed with 7 characters, padded by 
spaces if necessary. Possible values are 
'DEBUG', 'INFO', 'WARNING', 'ERROR', 
'CRITICAL'. 
6. The log message: String value. 
Moreover, we notice that the maximum length of an 
entire log record (attributes 1-6) is 512 characters. If 
the length exceeds 512 characters, it is truncated to 
the first 509 characters and three dots (‘…’) are 
added to the end of the record. Besides, if the length 
of the log message (attribute 6) is greater than a 
defined length this log message is truncated and 
three dots are also added to the end. We have also 
observed that the log message regarding to logging 
level ‘ERROR’, and ‘INFO’ consists of multiple 
lines, while other log messages only contain a single 
line. 
When analysing the log files, we noticed that the 
IMVULog file also stores information related to text 
communications. To analyse an IMVU chat, it is 
necessary to understand the following important 
aspects of a chat conversation: (i) Who says what to 
whom; (ii) In which chat session the conversation 
takes place, note that an user can be present in 
multiple rooms (chat sessions) at the ‘same’ time; 
(iii) Timestamp of the messages. 
The text of a single message appears more than once 
in different log records. Besides, in a chat room, it is 
possible to have a private conversation with just a 
single person in that room (at least one of users is a 
VIP). Whisper is a special feature available 
exclusively for VIPs. A VIP member can whisper to 
anyone and vice-versa, anyone can whisper to a VIP. 
Two non-VIP users however cannot use this feature 
to chat with each other. Moreover, the log message 
contains a list of several elements. The first element 
is the member id (‘userId’), the second one is a chat 
id (‘chatId’) and the last one contains dictionary data 
with keys and values. The value ‘0’ of the key 
indicates that the message was sent to the 
participant(s) of a room. There are one or more 
participants in a room. The value of the key 
‘message’ contains the actual chat message. We also 
note that the value sometimes contains an asterisk 
followed by a chat command. Besides, if the 
message exceeds the maximum length, as mentioned 
previously, it is truncated and three dots are added to 
the end.  
The value of the key ‘userId’ contains the member 
id of the sender of the text message. The value of the 
key ‘chatId’ contains a unique id for each chat 
session. Concurrent chat sessions in different rooms 
therefore have different IDs. This log record does 
not contain a timestamp. To determine the date and 
time of the message for these log records, there are 
two possibilities: 
1. Calculate the approximate timestamp using the 
number of seconds since the start of the 
application. This number is listed at the 
beginning of the log record. 
2. Combine it with the log records derived from 
the file SessionDispatcher.pyo. 
5.3 User profile data 
The IMVULog file only contains user profile data 
when the status is ‘Running’ (i.e. the application is 
running and the user is logged in). The following 
information can be retrieved from the user profile 
data: the users’ avatarname associated with the 
IMVU account, eight (8) asterisks of the users 
password. Note that the real user password is always 
replaced by eight asterisks. It is independent on the 
actual length of the password. Indeed, the most 
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comprehensive information can be retrieved from 
the multi line log message started with self.userInfo_ 
and followed by multiple lines of dictionary (pairs of 
<key, value>) data.  
The above information is based on the data entered 
by the user (Account Settings) and data allocated by 
IMVU. Besides, objects in IMVU are identified by a 
unique id such as, for example, Member ID, 
Room(Instance) ID, Session ID, Product ID or Chat 
ID. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Partial IMVU.log file 
 
 
 
Figure 4 IP address information in the IMVULog file 
 
5.4 User authentication data 
By investigating the Windows registry, we found 
that IMVU authenticate users by using username and 
password. This information is stored in the registry 
if the option ‘Save Password’ is selected. Indeed, the 
relvant password can be retrieved from the registry. 
The users avatar name associated with the IMVU 
account is also present in the IMVULog file. The 
IMVULog file also contains information about 
contacts such as ‘Friends”, “Buddies” or “Fans”. 
Besides, we also found that the buddystae.pyo script 
implements the logging process. 
5.5 Location data 
There is limited information on location. This 
already has been described under in User profile data 
section, where the ‘country’ key referrers to the geo-
location of the IP address used and ‘country_code’ 
referrers to the location specified by the user in the 
profile settings. In the IMVULog file the client and 
server IP addresses are listed. In the example shown 
in Figure 4, the client’s internal Local Area Network 
(LAN) private network address (192.168.3.45) is 
shown. When the system is directly connected to the 
Internet and receives an external Wide Area 
Network (WAN) public IP address, this IP address 
is listed in the log file. 
6. IMVU INTERNAL MEMORY FORENSICS  
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In this test, authors have explored the Python source 
code to understand how log records are buffered in 
memory. Whenever a record is added into the buffer, 
a check is made to see whether the buffer should be 
flushed or not. In fact, the buffer is periodically 
flushed whenever the buffer is full, or when an event 
of a certain severity happened. After making a 
memory dump of a running system, authors were 
able to retrieve log record data as previously 
described above. Besides, because a record consists 
of isolated fragments, it is difficult to link the 
messages to a date and time, a chat ID or the 
participants. We also notice that it was not possible 
to create a regular expression that fully matched all 
desired log records in EnCase because in Encase 
(version 6.19.7) a maximum limit of 255 characters 
that a single GREP expression could match is noted. 
Note that the maximum length of an entire log record 
(the log record attributes 1-6) is 512 characters.  
Therefore, there are fewer records found in EnCase 
than with the use of the in-house Python script. 
IMVU also creates a SQLite database in memory. 
Authors were able to modify the source code and 
save this database to hard disk. The database consists 
of only a single table and contains information about 
the HTTP cached files. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we present a forensic acquisition 
process of IMVU app. IM is one of the most popular 
digital communication technologies and widely 
used, but also being exploited by criminals due to its 
popularity and privacy features. So it is important 
that we are able to collect artefacts of IM apps. While 
most IM apps use a well-known formatted history 
file (also known as IM log or chat log) and there are 
tools available for digital evidence collection, this is 
not the case with IMVU. IMVU has a set of fixed 
number log files that contain not only chat messages, 
but also identifiable data. IMVU app also deletes old 
log files when the number of log files reaches a limit 
number. Forensic artefacts can also be found in user 
profile data, authenticated data and location data. 
Indeed, we can also retrieve IMVU artifact from the 
internal memory by explore its SQLite databases. 
We are working on the acquisition and analysis more 
forensic artefacts of an IMVU app such as registry 
information, network traffic data and unallocated 
disk space. 
REFERENCES 
[1] Wikimedia Foundation, Inc (2014) Comparison 
of instant messaging clients. Retrieved on 
December 17 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/Comparison_of_instant_messaging_clients  
[2] Wikimedia Foundation, Inc,  (2013) Child 
grooming. Retrieved on December 3 from http: 
//simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Child_grooming 
[3] Europol (2013) Threat Assessment - Italian 
Organised Crime. Retrieved on January 19 
from  https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/ 
default/files/publications/italian_organised_cri
me_threat_assessment_0.pdf  
[4] IMVU (2014) About IMVU. Retrieved on 
December 17 from http://nl.imvu.com/about/ 
[5] M. Goodman (2014) Crime and Policing in 
Virtual Worlds, Retrieved on December 17 
from http://f3magazine.unicri.it/? p=360 
[6] M. Garcia-Ruiz et al. (2011) An Overview of 
Child Abuses in 3D Social Networks and 
Online Video Games. Investigating Cyber Law 
and Cyber Ethics, Issues, Impacts and 
Practices, Hershey, Information Science 
Reference (IGI Global), p. 321 
[7] Paraben Corporation (2014) Paraben Chat 
Examiner. Retrieved on December 18 from: 
https://www.paraben.com/chat-examiner.html.  
[8] Belkasoft (2014) Belkasoft Evidence Center 
Retrieved on December 18 from: 
http://belkasoft.com/  
[9] National Institute of Justice (2007) 
Investigations Involving the Internet, Retrieved 
from https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/  
[10] M. Kiley, S. Dankner and M. Rogers (2008) 
Forensic Analysis of Volatile Instant 
Messaging Advances in digital forensics IV, 
New York, Springer, 2008 
[11] B. Lun (2012) Forensic Investigation for 
Instant Messenger, School of Computing and 
Mathematical Sciences, Auckland, New 
Zealand, 2012 
[12] M. Dickson (2006), “An examination into 
AOL Instant Messenger 5.5 contact 
identification,” Elsevier Ltd., 2006 
[13] M. I. Husain and R. Sridhar (2009) iForensics: 
Forensic Analysis of Instant Messaging on 
Smart Phones Digital Forensics and Cyber 
Crime, Albany, NY, USA, Springer, p. 182 
[14] C. Sgaras, M.-T. Kechadi and N.-A. Le-Khac 
(2014) Forensics Acquisition and Analysis of 
 9 
instant messaging and VoIP applications 
Springer Verlag LNCS 3850,  2011 
[15] S. Garfinkel, A. J. Nelson and J. Young (2012) 
A general strategy for differential forensic 
analysis Elsevier Ltd.,  
[16] AutoIt Consulting Ltd (2014) AutoIt, 
Retrieved on December 20 from 
https://www.autoitscript.com/site/autoit/ 
[17] Mozilla Developer Network, (2015) 
“Retrieved on February 5 from 
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/ 
